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  e Anthropology of Empty Spaces
Abstract
We would like to tell an anthropologic story about how we see reality and how we feel about it, with 
no intention to generalize our re! ections. Our version of anthropology is intentionally self-re! exive 
and self-re! ective. " is text is a narrative study of the feelings of anthropologists out in the # eld. 
" e anthropologic frame of mind is a certain openness of the mind of the researcher/ observer of social 
reality (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). On the one hand, it means the openness to new realities and 
meanings, and on the other – a constant need to problematize, a refusal to take anything for granted, 
to treat things as obvious and familiar. " e researcher makes use of her or his curiosity, the ability to 
be surprised by what she or he observes, even if it is „just” the everyday world.
Our explorations concern an experience of space. It aims at investigating the space not belonging 
to anyone. While ”anthropologically” moving around di$ erent organizations, we suddenly realized 
that we were part of stories of the space we were moving in. Areas of poetic emptiness can be 
experienced, often in the physical sense, on the boundaries and inside of organizations. 
Key words
anthropology, space, feelings, stories, sensemaking
Jerzy Kociatkiewicz
Essex Business School, University of Essex (a%  liated with University of Warsaw at the 
time of publication)
kociak@kociak.org
Monika Kostera
University of Warsaw
monika@kostera.pl
Article published (1999) in Qualitative Sociology 22/1: 37-50. © 1999 Human Sciences Press, Inc. DOI: 10.1023/A:1022131215755
" is copy includes the content of the article, but does not follow journal layout or page numbers.
Anthropology as a State of Mind
" e familiar spaces we are used to moving through 
teem with domesticated meanings. Other, exotic 
spaces carry abstract meanings unconnected to our 
everyday ones. And in between lies the unnoticed, the 
empty spaces unworthy of consideration. " is paper 
speaks about such unclaimed areas we encounter in 
our roles of organizational anthropologists as we try 
to make sense of the spatiality of the  # eld. We do it 
through narration. " e space we perceive through our 
own feelings and the stories we write become a kind of 
"thick descriptions" (Geertz, 1973) of ourselves in the 
# eld. " us, this text is an attempt of a self-re! ective 
ethnography of organizational space.
" ere are many ways of writing ethnographies (see 
e.g. Van Maanen, 1988; 1995). " ere are di$ erent 
approaches to organizational anthropology (e.g. 
Burszta, 1996; Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992, Wright, 
1994). Traditionally, they aim at experiencing and 
describing places that already exist, that belong to 
someone, presumably to someone other than the 
anthropologist studying them — explorations of the 
Other’s space.1
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Our explorations concern a di$ erent idea of space. 
Space, we understand similarly as Michel de Certeau 
(1984/ 1988) does. While "place" indicates stability, is 
an instantaneous con# guration of positions — "space" 
is mobile, it is a "practiced place" (p. 117), it "exists 
when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, 
velocities, and time variables" (p. 116). Our idea of 
space is also close to that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari (1986) when they speak of "smooth space," 
or a space "marked only by ‘traits’ that are e$ aced 
and displaced with the trajectory" (p. 51) — the 
space held by the nomad. We aim at investigating the 
not belonging to anyone. While ”anthropologically” 
moving around di$ erent organizations, we suddenly 
realized that we are able to see invisible things. We 
encountered many places that were empty, boundaries 
of the socially useful reality, borders of the domains of 
the everyday world that normally remain beyond the 
interest of both the people inhabiting the neighboring 
realities, and of the researchers. 
" e anthropologic frame of mind is a certain openness 
of the mind of the researcher/ observer of social reality 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). On the one hand, it 
means the openness to new realities and meanings, 
and on the other – a constant need to problematize, a 
refusal to take anything for granted, to treat things as 
obvious and familiar. " e researcher makes use of her 
or his curiosity, the ability to be surprised by what she 
or he observes, even if it is "just" the everyday world. 
" e anthropologist looks at the mundane and sees 
things that are engaging, that constitute an intellectual 
challenge. " is is also how Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar (1979/1986) see anthropology when they 
write about 
the importance of bracketing our familiarity with 
the object of our studies. By this we mean that we 
regard it as instructive to apprehend as strange those 
aspects [of the studied phenomenon] which we are 
readily taken for granted (p.: 29).
Anthropology in the social constructivist version rejects 
the belief in episteme in science and admits that the only 
thing available to us is doxa, which positivists classify 
as the inferior knowledge. Episteme (gr. knowledge, 
understanding) is traditionally seen as "superior 
knowledge," i.e. the knowledge about reality "as it 
really is," its mirror image. Doxa, meaning opinion, 
was perceived as less valuable, being by de# nition just 
biased knowledge, and consequently not deserving the 
exalted title of "science."  Constructivists, not insisting 
on the necessity to ”mirror” the  outside reality (Rorty, 
1980/ 1994), point out that science is always based 
on opinions on what reality is like. " e opinions of 
the scientists were traditionally seen as privileged, 
according to the grand narratives of modernity 
(Lyotard, 1979/1987) – the scientists were believed 
to be able to, thanks to the adoption of an adequate 
methodology, ”mirror” reality accurately, without the 
distortions characteristic of ”common opinion.”
Recently, among the many interesting tendencies 
within ethnography, there is a growing predisposition 
to self-re! exivity, the "ethnography of ethnography" 
(Van Maanen, 1995). In this vein, we re! ect in this 
paper on our role as anthropologists out in the # eld, 
and the emotional dimension of our experience — 
"the anthropologic state of mind." " is is a text about 
feelings. 
We attempt at crossing the boundary between 
objectivism and subjectivism in science – a dichotomy 
which we perceive as restraining. It is clear to us that it 
is we who speak, and we use our own voices. By doing 
it we wish to construct a scope of communication, call 
it intersubjectivity if you like, about something that 
we see as being ”out there” even if we do not reject 
solipsism (as other interpretivist anthropologists often 
do, see e.g. Van Maanen, 1988). However, as we are 
not trying to distance ourselves from the studied 
# eld, we believe that through the screen of ourselves 
we also see the places we are in. We thus sketch an 
impressionist landscape of our experiences, our private 
reading of reality. We believe that our experiences 
would not be the same if we chose to stay at the 
desktop computer, perhaps only imagining the change 
of surroundings, or maybe trying to alter our state of 
mind. Our study is thus narrative about the re! exive 
anthropology of the # eld outside of ourselves as a 
medium for communication between the two of us. 
  e Field
" e anthropologist is a character with a special 
inclination to be in the Field (Van Maanen, 1988). 
" e # eld attracts the anthropologist just as the sea 
charms the seaman of the romantic archetype. " e 
researcher cannot resist the temptation, leaves his or her 
comfortable corner by the computer and wanders o$  
into the unknown. " e unknown does not necessarily 
have to be the Samoa islands, because the researcher 
adopting an anthropologic frame of mind is able to 
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experience the same exoticism visiting the water supply 
plant in their own city as in some far away alien land. 
While staying in the # eld, the anthropologist loses her 
or his identity, and becomes an immigrant by own 
wish (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1992). Simultaneously 
it is not to be disregarded that it is through her or 
his own identity, experiences, and imaginations that 
the anthropologist sees the # eld: she or he cannot 
turn into a tabula rasa. " e non-participation in the 
orders of the # eld allows the researcher to question 
and problematize the ”obvious,” to take notice of the 
implicit assumptions on which the orders are founded. 
However, we do not claim that not accepting the 
assumptions of the studied # eld makes the observer 
”objective,” or ”more objective” than the insiders. We 
do not see it as possible, or desirable. 
Narrating Space
Our method is based on the assumption that space has 
a story (or perhaps is a story), but it takes some "work” 
to tell it. "Every story is a travel story — a spatial 
practice" writes Michel de Certeau (1984/ 1988, p. 
115), explaining that all sayings and stories organize 
places. According to Bruno Latour (1992), narration 
is based on association, i.e. a narrative adds episodes 
sequentially and chronologically (! rst this happened, 
and then happened that), and it operates on the sense 
of how things hang together. Jerome Bruner (1990) 
remarks that the temporal order of events is more 
important in a story than the truth or falsity (which 
is important in texts based on formal logic). " us, 
constructing a narrative is about spatial and temporal 
contextualization of experience and/or events. In our 
understanding (as in de Certeau’s), space and time 
are linked together within the narrative. Barbara 
Czarniawska (1997) lets her # eld speak in her narrative 
(she uses drama as an umbrella metaphor). Narration 
enables her to capture more about the complex and 
unpredictable (whereas formal logic eradicates and 
streamlines texts to devoid them of these paradoxical 
features). " rough the narrative composition of our 
"data," we hope to achieve a similar end, even though 
our "umbrella metaphor" (or what we would prefer to 
talk of as "umbrella genre") is poetics.
" e narrative approach is mainly used either as a 
genre for academic writing (e.g Corvellec, 1997; 
Czarniawska, 1997), or as a method for the collection 
of "data" (e.g Kostera, 1997). In the # rst sense,  the 
researcher tells a story about the reality she or he 
explores. In the second sense, the reality explored, 
is asked to tell stories (or poems) about itself. Both 
senses utilize stories in order to capture the context, 
the sublime, the implied, the emotional. In this text, 
we use the narrative approach in the both senses, i.e. we 
try to "evoke" the stories from the # eld (method) and 
compose the material in the form of stories (genre).
We were studying "ordinary" organizational # elds, and 
during such observations, we encountered, by accident, 
a place outside of our "ordinary" anthropologic 
interest, but one that we found fascinating in itself. 
" en the same kind of accidental encounters occurred 
several more times and after that, we found ourselves 
deliberately, but not in any planned or ordered 
fashion, looking for other spaces of the same type. We 
tried to keep an openness of mind while observing 
those spaces. We kept # eld notes — about the spaces 
as such and about the feelings they evoked in us. " en 
we wrote short stories on the basis of these notes, 
trying to embrace both the realistically observed 
and the sublime, which was not so easily expressed. 
" e result are poetic stories, some of which we cite 
in this paper. All of them are co-authored, that is, we 
wrote them together, which brought up not just our 
subjective perceptions, but also the dimension of our 
shared perception. All the stories concern us moving 
around in the # eld; thus, they can be seen as space 
stories (de Certeau, 1984/ 1988), perhaps an instance 
of nomadic storytelling, in the Deleuzian tradition 
(Delezue and Guattari, 1988/ 1996) involving both 
a deterritorialization of the empty spaces through our 
explorations and a reterritorialization of ourselves 
within these spaces.
  e Empty Spaces
Our idea of space is close to that of poetics as compared 
with rhetorics. Heather Höp!  (1995) reminds of the 
Aristotelian distinction between rhetorics and poetics 
in the context of organization studies. Poetics is based 
on ambivalence which is concealed by the mask of 
words and regulated by the text. Rhetorics is the open 
sketch of the text, the Leitmotif, consisting of the 
attempt at controlling the ambivalence, the limiting of 
it. Rhetorics is persuasion, argumentation, throwing 
bridges over chaos. Poetics lends voice to chaos, it is 
always ambivalent. It exists through the resonance 
with the elusiveness and inde# niteness of experience. 
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In the struggle over meaning in organizations 
the dominant voice is given to rhetorics. Poetics 
symbolizes everything that is subversive, rebellious, 
that cannot be managed entirely. We believe, though, 
that this distinction is not quite as functional – 
rhetorics can also be used for overthrowing existing 
structures, negating the embraced assumptions, and 
not necessarily proposing new meanings in the place 
of the ones questioned. Poetics can exist by the side 
of the de# ned concepts, ambivalent but not always 
demolishing the order – social order is based upon 
the ignoring and marginalizing of chaos, not on the 
elimination of it. Poetics displays the ambivalent chaos 
not by forcing the reader to perceive it – the persuasive 
role remains within rhetorics, while poetics aims at 
inviting the reader toward reading, interpreting and 
co-authroring the text.
According to Heather Höp! , poetics brings into the 
# rst plan what is traditionally seen as the background: 
the silence, the emptiness. In poetry, the silence speaks 
through metaphors, through the inde# niteness of 
the statements, also through the construction itself 
of the poem, consisting both of the words and of the 
exposed blanks. " e obsessive # lling in of the blanks, 
the blotting out of white pages witnesses of the lack 
of tolerance to ambivalence, of the greed to order 
impressions and reality. Actually, we see the process of 
elimination of the blanks more as that of erasing than 
of # lling – # lling implies gain, while what we often 
witness is actually the loss of emptiness. In the same 
vein, by # lling in the white spots on maps, people not 
only gained valuable information about the previously 
unknown lands, but also destroyed a whole host of 
legends that could exist only because of the white 
spots. " e emptiness which cannot be erased can 
simply be ignored, thrown outside the brackets of the 
perceived reality, made invisible, and safely forgotten. 
If something is meaningless, it is imperceptible. 
Yet reality is intransparent (Schütz, 1967), meaningless 
in itself. It is people who endow it with a meaning. 
In order to make some sense of the reality we live in, 
we have to be able to recognize things. In the process 
of socialization people are being o$ ered symbols 
telling them what they see, what they should see, and 
what it means when they do. Symbols are something 
like frozen layers of experience, made of people’s 
biographies, through which they perceive what 
they encounter in their lives and move on in their 
private histories. Symbolization is the de# nition of 
ambivalence. Every time people choose (consciously 
or not) one interpretation – which is also one of the 
possible versions of memory – over other ones, they 
give up many other potential realities. Symbolization 
is then something of a renderning to a few dimensions 
of an in# nitely multidimensional reality, the projecting 
of reality onto a map that can reasonably be made sense 
of. According to Schütz memory does not comprise 
of occurrences but of symbols (reconstructed every 
time they are evoked). Pure perception does not exist, 
because the internal being (or becoming) is assigned 
a memory. People always see the world through 
their memory. Meaning is the tension between what 
becomes and what is passing (Schütz, 1967; 1982). 
Reality is socially constructed on chaos, the order 
is frail and uncertain, the fear of ambivalence is 
understandable and a mighty motive behind many 
human attempts at limiting it: science is such an 
attempt, but so is totalitarianism. Ordering shuts 
our eyes on what is dazzlingly surprising and may be 
beautiful, it protects us from fear but maybe also from 
happiness. Feelings are chaotic. " e lack of order is 
a necessary requisite for creation and expression. " e 
pseudo-order mimics a # nal state, where change can 
only worsen the situation, whereas emptiness allows 
for creativity, for including the own visions and 
existing views, and for the construction of entirely 
new approaches. 
Ordering is a continuous process, and not a singular 
event of arranging the perceived reality into an 
easily understandable construct. Social orders are 
constructed as palimpsests – people add further 
fragments of text to existing discourses, they make 
small corrections and amendments. In the end, the 
chaos of reality, while not eliminated, is su%  ciently 
buried under the discourses accumulated through 
generations as to be non-obvious, and therefore easily 
dismissed as non-existent. Science is an instance of 
such a socially legitimized ordering of knowledge, 
constructed upon chaos (cf. Bauman, 1995). It does 
not make a complete whole if we believe in what T.S. 
Kuhn (1964) said about its development (and we like 
this idea). " e united theory of everything still remains 
only within the domain of pompous declarations and 
super# cial popular science (Feyerabend, 1975/ 1994). 
Change is achieved not because some people have 
”better eyesight” than others, and ”discover” what has 
been hidden before. Radical change is created through 
a more and more widespread writing down of a new 
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discourse beside existing discourses, not necessarily by 
the use of a new language. However, if the language 
stays the same or is a deviate of the old ones, the use of 
the language is new and so is the context (Feyerabend, 
1975/ 1994; 1987/ 1994). Change in science, then, 
is possible rather thanks to emptiness, more than 
through the use or the perfection of already existing 
constructs. Of course, this emptiness has # rst to be 
perceived, in some relation to what has been perceived 
by the person before. But the inscribing of it is more of 
a creative than re-creative process. At the boundaries 
of di$ erent scienti# c theories there often remain areas 
of discoherence, empty spaces that can be approached 
and entered.
Similar areas of emptiness can be experienced, often 
in the physical sense, on the boundaries and inside of 
organizations. " ey are in places to which no meaning 
is ascribed. " ey do not have to be physically cut o$  by 
fences or barriers. " ese are not prohibited places, but 
empty spaces, inaccessible because of their invisibility.
In the case of science and organizations – which are 
di$ erent aspects of the process of social ordering, or 
di$ erent versions of symbolization – the experience 
of emptiness was similar. Nevertheless, the empty 
spaces vary at least as much as the domesticated 
constructs. " e following stories are not supposed to 
represent all the aspects of the empty spaces that can 
be experienced, nor even a cross-section of the ones we 
have encountered, but just one possible ethnography. 
Field Study
A huge, looming building, punctured by a network of 
winding corridors, laid out according to the intention 
of some visionary architect, completely ba>  ing to 
the profane. " e walls radiate the glamour of classical 
serenity, it is obvious that everything is arranged 
according to some higher order that is just not easy 
to # gure out – this building is de# nitely a carefully 
planned and designed work of some educated follower 
of reason, and not a materialized dream of a madman. 
Similarly, the organization nesting in these halls is 
calm, stately, stern, conscious of its traditions, and 
de# nitely not prone to abandoning them in favour 
of any avant-garde ideas. A steady glow embodying 
the concepts of "logic" and "rationality" seems to 
emanate from every door, every wall, every corridor 
and room. STRUCTURE. We do not, however, try to 
understand the nature of the order contained in this 
building. Wandering through the corridors, lost and 
seemingly aimless, we ourselves do not know what we 
are looking for. And suddenly there it is, a staircase 
that, at a # rst glance, looks just like all the ones we have 
seen here before. Here, however, the stairs lead not 
only upwards, but also downwards, where everything, 
the whole reality that surrounds us, changes quite 
abruptly, transforms, mutates. After a short while, we 
# nd ourselves no more in the basement, but in some 
sort of a dungeon with ! aking walls and rows of heavy 
doors guarding the entrances to dark, damp cells. Most 
of the doors are closed, only a few allow us to enter the 
dark and empty rooms beyond them. Faint, yellowish 
light serves only to emphasize the darkness and 
gloom of these corridors. Rusting pipes and assorted 
cables crawl along the walls, unpredictable, chaotic, 
intensifying the already everpresent impression of 
alienness and otherworldliness. Most of the time these 
dungeons are empty, only rarely do we encounter 
any people, mostly workers, who ask what we are 
doing here, yet readily accept the explanation that we 
are just looking for an exit. We realize that such an 
underground does not belong in this building, that it 
derives from some entirely di$ erent reality. Indeed, for 
the ordinary participants of this organization it does 
not exist, there is nothing below the ground level. " e 
basement is not a restricted area, and neither is it an 
ugly underside of the otherwise ! awless structure. It 
simply does not exist. Only the visiting outsiders and 
the people who are not involved in the organizational 
order stand any chance if discovering it. An oddity, 
architectonic curiosity?  None of the kind. We know 
only what we see, but we see only what we know as 
well.
A change of setting. " e Palace of Culture,2 the highest 
! oor accessible to the visitors. Shabby panorama 
terrace; the grayish clouds hanging over the dirty, 
run-down townscape. Beside the important-looking 
tourist lift entrance, an inconspicuous door leads to a 
staircase. It is open. On our descent, we pass over thirty 
! oors worth of doors leading to various organizations 
– # rms, foundations, scienti# c institutes. " e stairs, 
however, remain unchanged all this time, seemingly 
unheeding of all the surrounding, organizations-
imposed realities. " e doors alone reveal the individual 
nature of each ! oor we pass. " ere is nobody but us 
around, all the people keep to their safe, domesticated 
areas and to the lifts leading there, antiseptically 
delivering their passengers through the realities they 
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consider indi$ erent or hostile. Nevertheless, this is no 
simple emergency stairway, its monumentality and the 
aura of grandeur rules out the exclusiveness of such a 
trivial and auxiliary function. What are they, then? A 
bridge over the gap between the realities?  Possibly, and 
yet, as all the bridges of this kind, they remain outside 
the area perceived by the participants and co-creators 
of these realities.
Another set of stairs, this one ends abruptly by 
running into a ceiling. A low-set landing, home to 
an  assortment of miscellaneous objects of mysterious 
shapes and uses. Dusty chests containing absurd 
items. A collection of metal tools suggesting the work 
of a mad constructivist. Shreds of paper, scraps of 
unidenti# ed materials. Grayish-brown dust melding 
into the deep, creeping shadows. " e steps above the 
landing are covered with a layer of whitish grime. " is 
is a dead end of a corridor connecting the o%  ces of 
the institution’s employees. Behind the doors, a hum 
of voices witnesses of the existence of another reality 
– the one where objects have clearly de# ned uses, 
where the stairs actually lead somewhere. " is recess 
is groundless, devoid of reason;  perhaps nobody has 
been here since long, and even if they have, it was by 
accident, or just to leave another useless object that 
did not even meet the criteria of a piece of garbage. 
" ere is no passage nor perspective; space is standing 
still here. A fragment of being for its own sake – with 
no depth.
" e next scene # nds us in a classroom at the university, 
at the lecture in the Anthropology of the processes of 
organizing. " is is the surrounding we know by heart, 
we have been here innumerable times. " is time, 
however, it is di$ erent. We talk about exploring the 
empty spaces:  one of us standing on a table, the other 
one sitting on the ! oor beside a chair. Out of the well-
known room we have torn the fragments of space that 
allow us to change our usual perspective. From the 
! oor one can see mostly the legs of the people and the 
grayness clinging to the ! oor. It is hard to make one’s 
voice sound important from down here. It is hard to 
gesture. Up on the table, the situation is reversed – 
this is the perfect place for gesturing, for raising one’s 
voice, for the depersonalized preaching of the grand 
truths. We do not, however, have any grand truths to 
proclaim, only our perceptions, impressions, feelings. 
Our message con! icts with the space, rede# ned from 
above and below, showing emptiness, allowing for at 
least a momentary glimpse of the reality outside the 
organization, outside the usual boundaries of the 
classroom. " e lecture comes to an end, the people 
leave the room, and the empty space once again turns 
into nothingness, even if a few more people realize its 
existence.
At a di$ erent point of our explorations, our quest for 
the empty space has led us to a suburbian fragment of 
the city. " ere are no real streets out there, only large 
asphalt roads and passages between almost identical 
apartment buildings. In the light of the setting sun 
this part of town becomes for us a space beyond the 
social paths, a place to lose oneself in. We consciously 
forfeit the sense of direction and let ourselves be 
claimed by the emergent area of unknowability and 
meaninglessness, where whole fragments reappear at 
the least expected moment, and looking back does not 
guarantee seeing the place we have recently passed. 
At # rst slowly and uncertainly, the neighborhood 
transcends into a strange sphere where the streets 
remain nameless, then the process of transformation 
accelerates and outpaces the awareness of authorship – 
we truly do not know where we are. Time changes, too; 
like space it ceases to carry the meaning we are used to. 
" is is not an empty space in the sense the ones we 
have encountered before were – it exists rooted solidly 
in the material realities of all the people living here; it 
is explored, tamed, safe. For us, however, it remains 
the wondrous source of otherworldly amazement, 
ever changing, ever ambiguous. What does, then set 
us apart from all these other people?  " e passage 
into this other time-space is a state of mind – the 
abandonment of purpose, the willingness of stepping 
into irrationality, outside the bonds of "normal" space, 
into emptiness.
A Passage in Space
" e empty space is a part of reality, including 
organizational reality; it is, however, reality 
intentionally  misread. " e empty space is a 
deconstruction of social space: empowering the silence 
to speak for itself, concentration on the marginalized 
elements. Instead of reading the written text, we read 
the blank background. " is change of perspective is 
similar to the well known picture showing alternately a 
young or an old woman – depending on how one looks 
at it. " e space we explored lies beyond the familiar 
orders, it does not belong to anyone. In our reading 
we construct a space out of the anti-space – a re! ection 
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of our own state of mind. We became conscious of the 
existence of the empty spaces and the ambiguity they 
carry, and we accepted the chaos — the poetic — as 
the integral part of our reality, not trying to eradicate 
it in the obsessed chase after the grand, total, univocal, 
mystical, and unattainable Order.
A Study in Emptiness
" e social space one inhabits is a collection of aims and 
roads, a map of everyday reality. One’s own everyday 
life world is always the most boring. Alien worlds 
that people visit once in a while (foreign countries, 
unfamiliar organizations, etc.) can be interesting and 
exotic, but nonetheless for most people come down 
to a collection of aims and roads – only touristic 
ones. Between the everyday reality and boredom, and 
tourism and exoticism there is an empty space, not 
belonging to anyone in particular. It is imperceptible 
for the inhabitants and the visitors alike, it lies beyond 
the sphere of interest of people who do not actively look 
for the unconventional in ordinary places. Emptiness 
remains, however, the integral part of every ordered 
space, the invisible conjunction between its di$ erent 
aspects. It is in these empty spaces that possibilities 
for change are hidden, beyond the rational designs for 
development and transformation.
An inhabited space is anonymous, especially a 
crowded one, such as big cities and companies. People 
have their paths of passage between the ”villages” 
of sensible life among others. " ese others function 
similarily. People can avoid anonymity by moving 
around the space unclaimed by themselves in groups, 
surrounded by a movable village. It is also possible to 
construct something of a tunnel of passage – a tunnel 
of waiting: in the bus, in the car, in the elevator. " ese 
tunnels are tight spheres of spaces where most people 
concentrate on some other, already tamed slices of 
space and time, or construct own slices of this kind 
by reading a newspaper, listening to music. " e space 
without the villages becomes an entirely di$ erent 
environment, devoid of sense, as if the person were 
suddenly dislocated into a void, pulled out of the 
context of the known reality, familiar interpretations, 
forced to rede# ne one’s surroundings by every step 
he or she takes, because of an excessive multitude 
of new impressions demanding interpretation. Our 
explorations have led us into such an unknown 
territory, outside of the order associated with the 
villages of sense.
" e emptiness we have experienced there, and the lack 
of predetermined choices or results it seems to carry, as 
well as its setting outside the structures of power, makes 
us think of freedom. According to Zygmunt Bauman 
(1995), freedom through privacy is expensive: it costs 
money to buy a private space where one is free from 
the intrusion of other people; it also costs in terms 
of resigning from social needs, it is paid for through 
loneliness. Our empty spaces are freedom beyond 
these expenses. In # nancial terms they cost nothing: 
we were experiencing them for free. Even if they asked 
for some experience of loneliness, in our case it could 
be shared loneliness;  we had a very strong feeling of 
separation from the usual social reality, yet we both 
felt we shared the same experience of emptiness. We 
agree with Bauman (1995) when he claims that the 
desire for freedom is tied to ambivalence: people long 
for freedom, but fear loneliness. " e kind of loneliness 
we have experienced in the empty spaces was not 
unpleasant. Empty spaces can be a kind of meditative 
freedom. " is is not to say that experiencing them does 
not cost absolutely anything – in order to see them, we 
had to abandon the illusion of order usually imposed 
on the perceived realities. We do not mourn the loss, 
however, as it o$ ers the possibility of altering the 
perception, as the ensuing chaos allows the freedom of 
creation, or the freedom of wonder.
" is takes us back to our re! ection on poetics, 
rhetorics, and the experience of emptiness. Karl Weick 
(1995) writes about the substance of sensemaking: 
words and vocabularies. "Sense is generated by words 
that are combined into the sentences of conversation 
to convey something about our ongoing experience" 
(p. 106). People pull from di$ erent vocabularies: 
these of society, of organizations, of occupations and 
professions, of coping, of predecessors, of sequence 
and experience. However,
all of these words that matter invariably come up 
short. " ey impose discrete labels on subject matter 
that is continuous. " ere is always slippage between 
words and what they refer to. Words apporximate 
the territory; they never map it perfectly (p. 107).
In our process of sensemaking of the empty spaces we 
refrained from using any of the rhetorical vocabularies, 
relying on a poetical one, not aiming at exclusion of 
ambiguity or the slippage between words and what 
they refer to. If we agree with Weick that sensemaking 
is an act of patterning, comprehending, redressing 
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surprise, and creating meaning, our experience of 
the empty spaces does not include sensemaking. If, 
on the other hand, we concentrate on his suggestion 
that sensemaking is about authoring and reading the 
text, our explorations are that, although of a di$ erent 
kind. What we were doing can perhaps be seen as 
misreading and misauthoring. We were not looking 
for one sense but for a multitude of them. We can be 
seen as constructing and subsequently reading a text, 
albeit a poetical one, where no single meaning needs 
to (or should) emerge in the process of creation or 
interpretation.
Emptiness does not exist. It is an anti-frame of 
reference, becoming pertinent only in some scienti# c 
theories, such as the theory of black holes, or in 
some legends, such as the story about the Bermuda 
Triangle. In philosophy and theology it symbolizes the 
speculation about what happens when the subject is 
no more, a version of hell for the less folkloristically 
minded thinkers about death. Emptiness is generally 
associated with death or non-existence. " us it 
serves the role of the other side, the contradiction 
of life, or its only meaningsful form – social life. 
Emptiness as such does not exist, it can only be 
de# ned negatively, as the opposition to what it is 
not. " rough its inde# niteness and undescribability 
it gains supernatural aspects, becomes like God, who, 
according to some, can be described through the use 
of words like: void, loneliness, silence, absence (Eco, 
1986/87), expressions which refer to emptiness in 
the # rst place. Emptiness is in# nite, as a form of time 
and as a form of space. It is not de# ned by any target 
points, any cognitive structures, habits, expectations. 
It is everywhere and nowhere.
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Endnotes
1 A classical position should be acknowledged here: 
Emile Durkheim (1960/ 1964) suggested, for 
example, that the space occupied by a society — a 
trait of the external form should be studied in order 
to understand the social structure and its functions. 
Elsewhere (1960), he re! ected on the consequences of 
the degree in which space is occupied for the social 
division of labor.
It may be also relevant to note that Michel de Certeau 
(1975) in his musings on ethnography (ethno-graphy) 
spoke of communication as the space of the Other. 
2 " e Palace of Culture and Science, originally the 
Palace of Joseph Stalin, is a giant construction in 
pompous social-realist style, o$ ered to the city of 
Warsaw by the Soviet Union in the early 50. 
